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Me, Myself, and My Digital Double: Extending
Sara Greene’s Stealing (Identity) From the Poor
to the Challenges of Identity Verification
Michele Estrin Gilman†
“In the social jungle of human existence, there is no feeling of being alive
without a sense of identity.” —Erik Erikson1
“We are not hiding who we are. We are who we say we are.” —Tricia George,
unemployment insurance applicant locked out of the system2

INTRODUCTION
Identity is foundational to human existence. Philosopher John
Locke linked identity to consciousness, which “makes every one to be,
what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other
thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity . . .”3 Psychologist Erik Erikson echoes this conception, def ining identity as “the
awareness of the fact that there is a self sameness and continuity to
the ego’s synthesizing methods, the style of one’s individuality, and
that this coincides with the sameness and continuity of one’s meaning
for signif icant others in the immediate community.”4 Given the centrality of identity to the human condition, the theft or denial of identity
can be profoundly destabilizing, leading to deprivations of core human rights and psychological distress. These identity-based harms are

† Venable Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development, Director Saul Ewing Civil Advocacy Clinic, University of Baltimore School of Law.
Copyright © 2022 by Michele Estrin Gilman.
1. ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS 130 (1968).
2. Aldo Svaldi, Unemployed Coloradans Struggling with Identity Verif ication: “We
Are Who We Say We Are,” DENVER POST (Apr. 25, 2021), https://www.denverpost.com/
2021/04/25/colorado-unemployment-identity-verif ication-fraud [https://perma.cc/
XL3R-YTSG].
3. JOHN LOCKE, Of Identity and Diversity, in AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, BOOK 2 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Clarendon Press 1975) (1689).
4. ERIKSON, supra note 1, at 50.
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heightened in the dataf ied society, which dissembles identity into millions of data points shared across numerous networks for prof it and
surveillance. Sara Greene’s article, Stealing (Identity) From the Poor,5
brings an economic justice lens to the ways in which data breaches
lead to identity theft, with devastating consequences for people experiencing poverty.
Greene’s article is timely in ways she could not have envisioned
at the start of her project, which blends legal analysis with qualitative
interviews. As a result of the pandemic, almost a quarter of Americans
lost their jobs and turned to their states’ unemployment insurance
(UI) systems for economic support.6 These systems run on automated
platforms and churn out algorithmic determinations of eligibility.7
Criminal syndicates took advantage of the deluge of applications and
the digitalization of UI to steal the identity of millions of Americans
and f ile false claims, resulting in at least $87 billion in fraudulent payments.8 In response, state labor agencies frantically sought to stanch
the f low of stolen funds, and in so doing, imposed a variety of new
identity verif ication requirements on UI claimants and deployed automated fraud detection systems. At the federal level, President Biden
issued a statement pledging a coordinated governmental response “to
the exploitation of relief programs by criminal syndicates using stolen
identities to steal government benef its.”9

5. Sara S. Greene, Stealing (Identity) From the Poor, 106 MINN. L. REV. 60 (2021).
6. See Cezary Podkul, How Unemployment Insurance Fraud Exploded During the
Pandemic, PROPUBLICA (July 26, 2021), https://www.propublica.org/article/how
-unemployment-insurance-fraud-exploded-during-the-pandemic [https://perma.cc/
CKN7-LF5S]; Andrew Stettner & Elizabeth Pancotti, 1 in 4 Workers Relied on Unemployment Aid During the Pandemic, THE CENTURY FOUND. (Mar. 17, 2021), https://tcf.org/
content/commentary/1-in-4-workers-relied-on-unemployment-aid-during-the
-pandemic/?agreed=1 [https://perma.cc/NRM2-RFYM].
7. See infra Part III.
8. Podkul, supra note 6; see also FBI Sees Spike in Fraudulent Unemployment Insurance Claims F iled Using Stolen Identities, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (July 6, 2020),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-sees-spike-in-fraudulent
-unemployment-insurance-claims-f iled-using-stolen-identities
[https://perma.cc/
RK66-J6XJ]; Unemployment Insurance Fraud, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 3, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/coronavirus/national-unemployment-insurance-fraud
-task-force [https://perma.cc/7JJ4-4DFR].
9. Statement of President Joe Biden on American Rescue Plan Oversight, THE
WHITE HOUSE (May 17, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/brief ing-room/
statements-releases/2021/05/17/statement-of-president-joe-biden-on-american
-rescue-plan-oversight/ [https://perma.cc/KU5D-UCKN].
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Identity verif ication involves taking the data presented by an individual and comparing it against an existing database.10 As a result of
these automated systems, states wrongfully denied benef its to millions of eligible people—many of whom were themselves victims of
identity theft and thus had applications f lagged as fraudulent.11 These
workers were denied the very f inancial support designed to keep
them af loat during times of economic calamity. This nationwide f iasco
tightened the connection between identity theft and identify verif ication, demonstrating the perils of the dataf ication of identity. Both reveal the modern, dual reality of identity, as Mark Poster explains:
“Identity fragments into an aspect of consciousness (an awareness of
continuity in time and space) and a complex of media content contained in information machines that combine to def ine an individual.”12 This latter notion of identity as “exteriorization and materialization”13 results because “[a]s people go about their daily lives they
actively invoke or unknowingly draw upon a host of bureaucratic
identity markers, in the process producing yet more information
about their behaviours which institutions store, analyse and sell.”14
This Essay assesses the government’s use of identity verif ication systems in social services through Greene’s lens of identity theft harms
and plutocratic regulation. Identity theft and identity denial are mirror images of the problem of digitized identity systems, and both have
outsized impacts on marginalized people.
I. IDENTITY THEFT
Greene’s article soundly debunks the myth that people experiencing poverty are not victims of identity theft. Conventional wisdom
among the public and policymakers is that low-income people are not
desirable targets for identity thieves because their credit scores are
low. However, as Greene explains, this is simply not true. Identity
thieves do not care if they assume high-interest or sub-prime loans in
someone else’s name because they have no intention of paying back

10. See Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475, 1491
(2013).
11. See infra Part III.
12. Mark Poster, The Secret Self: The Case of Identity Theft, 21 CULTURAL STUD. 118,
137 (2006).
13. Id. at 119.
14. Jennifer R. Whitson & Kevin D. Haggerty, Identity Theft and the Care of the Virtual Self, 37 ECON. & SOC’Y 572, 574 (2008).
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lenders.15 Moreover, an identity as a low-income individual is necessary to steal a variety of public benef its.16 These criminals act with the
further assurance that low-income people are less likely to report
these crimes to law enforcement due to distrust or to pursue available
civil remedies, which are costly and complex.17
In exposing the class dimensions of identity theft, Greene adds
heaps of evidence to counter the “dead bodies” problem in privacy
law.18 For years, privacy scholars struggled to explain why privacy
matters, given its ephemeral nature. In 2006, Ann Bartow criticized
privacy theorists for failing to identify the “dead bodies” left bare by
privacy violations, that is, to show how “privacy violations can negatively impact the lives of living, breathing human beings beyond
simply provoking feelings of unease.”19 Since this potent critique,
there has been considerable research detailing the many ways in
which marginalized people suffer concrete, privacy-related harms in
the dataf ied society.20 To be sure, every member of society is an unwitting subject of surveillance capitalism, in which personal data is
collected, aggregated, and sold across multiple industries and governments.21 Americans are increasingly aware of this data scraping and
report discomfort with the targeting and tailoring of advertising and
internet content.22 As one woman told the Washington Post: “She
doesn’t like the way Facebook collects her personal data to target ads,
or the kinds of videos YouTube offers to her child, and she suspects
that her devices are always listening.”23 In a nationwide survey, a large
15. Greene, supra note 5, at 75.
16. Id. at 75–76.
17. Id. at 64.
18. Ann Bartow, A Feeling of Unease about Privacy Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 52, 52 (2006).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Mary Madden, Michele Gilman, Karen Levy & Alice Marwick, Privacy,
Poverty, and Big Data: A Matrix of Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV.
53 (2017). See generally VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH
TOOLS PROF ILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018); CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH
DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2017);
RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY: ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR THE NEW JIM CODE
(2019); CATHERINE D’IGNAZIO & LAUREN F. KLEIN, DATA FEMINISM (2020).
21. See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE F IGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 8–12 (2019).
22. Heather Kelley & Emily Guskin, Americans Widely Distrust Facebook, TikTok
and Instagram With Their Data, Poll F inds, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2021), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/12/22/tech-trust-survey [https://perma.cc/
98DL-DTYW].
23. Id.
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majority of Americans reported f inding these online targeted advertising practices “annoying” and “invasive.”24
However, marginalized people suffer tangible harms above and
beyond this sense of discomfort. Based on their digital prof iles, lowincome people are targeted for predatory marketing and subprime
f inancial products.25 At the same time, algorithmic decision-making
systems serve as gatekeepers that can exclude people from mainstream employment, housing, f inancial, health care, and educational
opportunities.26 Government agencies rely on algorithms to apportion
social services, yet these algorithms lack transparency, leaving thousands of people adrift without state support and not knowing why.27
Marginalized communities are also subject to disproportionately high
levels of surveillance in their neighborhoods, workplaces, and
schools.28 To this litany of harms, we can now add Greene’s careful accounting of the injuries of identity theft, which play out with far graver
consequences for low-income people. As Greene explains, these victims suffer more than the inconvenience and aggravation of clearing
up a credit report, which is the typical consequence for their wealthier
counterparts. They can face “job loss, harassing debt collection, loss of
health care or other benef its, and wage garnishment.”29 In turn, this
can lead to an economic death spiral which creates a “hindrance to
upward mobility and in fact a catalyst to drive people further into poverty.”30
Greene’s concept of plutocentric regulation provides a helpful
frame for understanding why and how legal solutions to privacy problems are designed for middle-class interests, leaving the poor behind.
As she explains, “it is common for the experiences of low-income and
underrepresented groups to be disregarded and thus for regulations
to focus on protecting prototypical higher income groups.”31 This
frame holds true for privacy law in general. I have previously explored
the ways that privacy law is shaped around the concerns of wealthier

24. Id. (f inding that 82% of people stated the ads were annoying and 74% considered them invasive).
25. Michele E. Gilman, F ive Privacy Principles (from the GDPR) the United States
Should Adopt to Advance Economic Justice, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 368, 371 (2019).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 394.
29. Greene, supra note 5, at 65.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 103.
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Americans at the expense of people experiencing poverty.32 The genesis of privacy law is “the right to be let alone,” as conceived in 1890
by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, who developed their concept
of privacy as a buffer to protect society’s elites from the glare of public
scrutiny and media attention.33 This conception and its manifestation
into law does not account for the interrelated relationships between
low-income people and the government, which demands access to the
homes and bodies of the poor, as well as their personal life histories
as a condition of providing economic support.34 “The idea of being left
alone creates a class differential that shelters those who can afford it.
The result is that the poor are often subject to humiliating and stigmatizing data collection practices.”35
As Greene explores, the class differential that leaves poor people
behind in privacy law is likewise found in the legal regime for identity
theft. Lawsuits for data breaches provide scant relief to low-income
victims because they often do not know the source of their data
breach, do not have access to lawyers, and, in any event, courts dismiss most of the lawsuits that are brought due to a lack of concrete
harms.36 Federal legislation designed to put fraud alerts on credit reports and to repair credit do not effectively reach low-income victims
who are often not familiar with credit reporting agencies and generally lack knowledge of their legal rights.37 Further, credit problems are
only one of the type of harms impacting low-income victims of identity
theft.38 Another stumbling block to relief is that many companies (and
some state laws) require a police report as a precondition to establishing one’s status as an identity theft victim.39 However, many lowincome victims, particularly those who are Black, are reluctant to report to police given the fraught relations and distrust between their
communities and law enforcement due to over-policing and mass incarceration policies.40 And even when victims do report to police, they

32. Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV.
1389 (2012).
33. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 195 (1890).
34. Gilman, supra note 32, at 1427.
35. Id.
36. Greene, supra note 5, at 89–91.
37. Id. at 92–93.
38. Id. at 93.
39. Id. at 98–99.
40. Id. at 99–100, 112.
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are often turned away, as many local police departments do not consider identity theft a criminal matter within their jurisdiction.41 At the
end of the day, even with a lawyer, tools for combatting identity theft
are limited, unduly complicated, and time-consuming. People with resources can ride out this process; poor people cannot.
II. PROOF OF IDENTITY
The harms and mismatched remedies for identity theft are mirrored in identity verif ication systems, and thus Greene’s article can
help us understand this widespread, but undertheorized threshold for
participating in modern society. Proof of identity is what makes people legible to the state and other entities. In the United States, it is necessary to vote, to work, to obtain housing, to register in school, to
travel, to obtain government assistance, to marry, to obtain medical
records and certain medicines, to get a vaccine, and to access f inancial
services.42 Citizens simply “cannot properly exercise a variety of constitutionally protected activities—from marrying to bearing arms to
traveling to voting—without possessing and producing identifying
documents.”43
In the modern era, a recognized identity is core to human rights.44
The 1948 International Declaration of Human Rights sets forth “the
right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law”45 as well as
“the right to a nationality.”46 Given that there are over 1.1 billion people in the world today without off icial identif ication,47 in 2015 the
United Nations set as one of its Sustainable Development Goals the requirement that states “provide legal identity to all including through
birth registration, by 2030.”48 At their best, identif ication processes
can enforce individual rights and expand access to state support.
41. Id. at 100.
42. See Gregory Zlotnick, Picking the Lock: A Proposal for a Standard Fee Waiver
in Texas for Identif ication Documents, 22 THE SCHOLAR 345, 356–57 (2020); Waldo Jaquith, Americans Need a Digital Identity System, Stat!, 15 CMTY. DEV. INNOVATION REV. 53,
53 (2021), https://www.frbsf.org/community-development/f iles/jaquith-americans
-need-a-digital-identity-system-stat.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4ER-ZBG9].
43. Zlotnick, supra note 42, at 357–58.
44. ALAN GELB & ANNA DIOFASI METZ, IDENTIF ICATION REVOLUTION: CAN DIGITAL ID BE
HARNESSED FOR DEVELOPMENT? 2 (2018).
45. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 6 (Dec. 10,
1948).
46. Id. art. 15.
47. GELB & METZ, supra note 44, at 6.
48. G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, para. 16.9 (2015).
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“They also can help build state capacity to deliver public services and
social protection programs more effectively, to manage public spending, and to make public institutions more accountable.”49 Yet at their
worst, they can “exclude poor and vulnerable groups and support institutionalized discrimination; ID systems can also facilitate state and
commercial surveillance.”50
In the United States, we do not have a national identity card, and
there is no single document or standard for establishing identity.51 Rather, identity is typically established through state-issued driver’s licenses or federally generated documents, such as military IDs, passports, and green cards.52 However, many poor people do not possess
these forms of documentation. Indeed, most identity verif ication regimes are created with plutocentric assumptions about the ease of
proving identity.
This issue has gotten the most attention with regard to voter
identif ication. In states with strict photo ID requirements, voting rates
among minorities are lower than in other states, making voter ID a
core issue of civil rights.53 Eleven percent of voters lack photo identif ication; this gap is higher for minorities and the elderly.54 For African Americans, the rate is twenty-f ive percent; for Hispanics it is sixteen percent; for Native Americans it is nineteen percent;55 and for
people over sixty-f ive it is eighteen percent.56 Members of these
groups face numerous barriers to obtaining photo ID, such as lacking

49. GELB & METZ, supra note 44, at 4.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 24–25.
52. Jaquith, supra note 42.
53. Zoltan Hajnal, Nazita Lajevardi & Lindsay Nielson, Voter Identif ication Laws
and the Suppression of Minority Votes, 79 J. POL. 363, 368 (2017). The issue has been
litigated all the way to the Supreme Court. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd.,
553 U.S. 181, 185–204 (2008) (upholding Indiana’s restrictive state voter identif ication law against an Equal Protection challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment). Additionally, it has been addressed by lower federal courts. See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d
216, 243–65 (5th Cir. 2016) (striking down Texas’s voter identif ication law as racially
discriminatory under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
54. Keesha Gaskins & Sundeep Iyer, The Challenge of Obtaining Voter Identif ication, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 1 (2012), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/
research-reports/challenge-obtaining-voter-identif ication [https://perma.cc/9F6A
-LJJM].
55. Theodore R. Johnson & Max Feldman, The New Voter Suppression, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research
-reports/new-voter-suppression [https://perma.cc/TR8M-KU44].
56. Gaskins & Iyer, supra note 54, at 2.
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a vehicle to drive to an ID-issuing off ice and limited public transportation, particularly in rural areas. They can also confront variable and
limited business hours for ID-issuing off ices that can conf lict with
work or child care obligations.57 For instance, when Alabama sought
to close a budget shortfall, the state closed thirty-one driver’s license
off ices, exclusively in poor areas.58 In addition, while states with restrictive voter ID laws waive the cost of a photo ID for poor and/or
elderly citizens, people still must pay for the underlying proof of identif ication, such as a birth certif icate (costs range between f ifteen and
thirty dollars) or a marriage license for women who changed their surnames (costs range between four and forty dollars).59 And, in a catch
twenty-two, to obtain a copy of a birth certif icate, some jurisdictions
require photo identif ication.60
People experiencing homelessness or evictions are at high risk of
losing existing documentation due to housing instability.61 Moreover,
there are many people who were never issued birth certif icates in the
f irst place (typically because they were born at home, and their births
were not recorded)62 or whose birth certif icates contain errors on key
identif iers.63 In these circumstances, states require a bevy of alternate
off icial records to establish identity, such as school attendance records or documentation about a spouse—each with its own costs and
administrative burdens.64 For poor people, the process of obtaining
57. Id.
58. Atiba R. Ellis, Economic Precarity, Race, and Voting Structures, 104 KY. L.J. 607,
626–27 (2016).
59. Gaskins & Iyer, supra note 54, at 14.
60. Zlotnick, supra note 42, at 347.
61. Patrick Marion Bradley, The Invisibles: The Cruel Catch-22 of Being Poor with
No ID, WASH. POST (June 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/
magazine/what-happens-to-people-who-cant-prove-who-they-are/2017/06/14/
fc0aaca2-4215-11e7-adba-394ee67a7582_story.html
[https://perma.cc/EB7T
-KMJZ].
62. Leighton Ku & Matt Broaddus, New Requirement for Birth Certif icates of Passports Could Threaten Medicaid Coverage for Vulnerable Benef iciaries: A State-by State
Analysis, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 3 (Feb. 17, 2006), https://www.cbpp
.org/sites/default/f iles/archive/1-5-06health.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9E9-3N66].
“A particular problem exists for a large number of elderly African Americans
because they were born in a time when racial discrimination in hospital admissions, especially in the South, as well as poverty, kept their mothers from
giving birth at a hospital. One study estimated that about one in f ive African
Americans born in the 1939–40 period lack a birth certif icate because of
these problems.”
Id.
63. Gaskins & Iyer, supra note 54, at 14.
64. Id.
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identif ication can take months—a timeline extending far beyond
emergency needs—and involve a process that requires time and
money to travel to numerous government off ices, oftentimes with no
success.65 Not surprisingly, legal services lawyers are deluged with requests from clients needing help establishing their off icial identity.66
As the director of the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty stated, “Without an ID, basically you don’t exist.”67 Or, as political
scientist James C. Scott ref lects, “The categories used by state agents
are not merely means to make their environment legible; they are an
authoritative tune to which most of the population must dance.”68
III. IDENTITY VERIF ICATION
The reality of bureaucratic non-existence came to the fore during
the pandemic, particularly for the working poor. As described earlier,
the pandemic put intense demand on state unemployment insurance
programs, whose automated systems collapsed due to high demand
and inadequate staff ing.69 UI benef its are funded by employer-paid
taxes and administered by the states, subject to federal oversight.70
Although state policies vary, UI generally provides for up to twentysix weeks of benef its, replacing about half of a worker’s previous, regular wages.71 Pandemic era relief statutes expanded UI eligibility to
self-employed people and part-time workers, boosted the amount of
benef its, and extended the timeline for relief.72 However, from the
start of the pandemic, many automated UI systems across the country
were unable to deliver on the promised relief.73 For months, the news

65. Bradley, supra note 61.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 57 (1998).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 6–9.
70. See Manuel Alcalá Kovalski & Louise Sheiner, How Does Unemployment Insurance Work? And How Is It Changing During the Coronavirus Pandemic?, BROOKINGS (Nov.
3, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/07/20/how-does-unemployment-insurance-work-and-how-is-it-changing-during-the-coronavirus
-pandemic [https://perma.cc/3GZR-9PQW].
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.

2022]

ME, MYSELF, AND MY DIGITAL DOUBLE

311

media was awash with horror stories from applicants struggling to obtain their UI benef its online.74 The unemployed described UI application websites that froze, crashed, f lashed error messages, and went
off line at random hours.75 Thousands of people were locked out of
their accounts due to password reset issues and alleged fraud; these
frustrated applicants overwhelmed call centers with requests for assistance.76 One study found that over a third of UI applicants were unable to f ile a claim and that two out of ten found the systems too complicated to even try.77
Criminal syndicates swooped in to take advantage of the new
funding streams and the disarray in disbursing funds, stealing at least
$36 billion in false claims.78 Identity theft, which had not seriously
plagued UI programs before, became an urgent problem, and identity
verif ication became the solution. In December 2020, Congress enacted an identity verif ication requirement for the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance Program (PUA), which covers workers not typically qualif ied for traditional UI, such as self-employed persons and
independent contractors.79 Many states then expanded such requirements to all UI claims, even those outside PUA. In the wake of the new
requirements, many identity theft victims were themselves applying
for UI and found themselves locked out of the systems and denied the

74. See Michele Gilman & Mary Madden, Digital Barriers to Economic Justice in the
Wake of COVID-19, DATA & SOC’Y 11 (2021), https://datasociety.net/wp-content/
uploads/2021/04/Digital-Barriers-to-Economic-Justice-in-the-Wake-of-COVID
-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/HY3T-72P6].
75. Id.; Amy Traub, 7 Things We Learned about Unemployment Insurance During
the Pandemic, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT 7–8 (2021), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp
-content/uploads/Seven-Things-We-Learned-from-Pandemic-UI.pdf [https://perma
.cc/ELL4-BKZ9].
76. Gilman & Madden, supra note 74, at 11.
77. Ben Zipperer & Elise Gould, Unemployment F iling Failures: New Survey
Conf irms That Millions of Jobless Were Unable to F ile an Unemployment Insurance Claim,
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.epi.org/blog/unemployment-f iling
-failures-new-survey-conf irms-that-millions-of-jobless-were-unable-to-f ile-an
-unemployment-insurance-claim [https://perma.cc/2WW8-W3DM].
78. See Podkul, supra note 6; Andrew Ackerman & Amara Omeokwe, Covid-19 Relief Fraud Potentially Totals $100 Billion, Secret Service Says, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/thefts-of-covid-19-relief-funds-total-at-least-100
-billion-secret-service-says-11640202072 [https://perma.cc/QF9U-2SM6].
79. 15 U.S.C. § 9021(f ) (2021).
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relief for which they were eligible.80 They were “victimized twice.”81
The resulting harms of identity denial tracked those associated with
identity theft victims. Without economic support, eligible claimants
suffered evictions, repossessed cars, unpaid bills, disconnected utilities, lack of food, and mental health issues.82 In short, identity verif ication has not been working as promised, and millions of Americans remain unable to establish that they are, in fact, themselves. Identity
verif ication may look like a routinized and mundane function; however, “it is through the daily routines of proceduralism and precedent
setting that social inequalities, such as those of class and gender, are
produced and maintained.”83 Indeed, society’s most marginalized
populations have been disproportionately harmed by identity
verif ication in UI, including people of color, transgender persons, noncitizens (who are eligible for benef its), and people who are limited
English prof icient.84 Three primary barriers to identity verif ication
emerged during the pandemic: a lack of design justice, denials of due
process, and privatization.
A. DESIGN INJUSTICE
F irst, the automated identity verif ication systems were not built
with the needs and experiences of low-income people in mind. To
begin with, the UI platforms were designed with the assumption that

80. See, e.g., David Wagner, Unemployment Benef its Frozen Due to Being a Fraud
Victim? Here’s What to Do, LAIST (Oct. 22, 2020), https://laist.com/news/
unemployment-edd-california-pua-fraud-identity-benef its-frozen-restart [https://
perma.cc/44NU-SMRV].
81. Memorandum on Identity Verif ication in UI Systems—Recommendations,
National Employment Law Project 1 (Oct. 9, 2021) (on f ile with author) [hereinafter
NELP Memo].
82. See, e.g., Stettner & Pancotti, supra note 6 (“[D]elays have not only frustrated
claimants, but also they have put the unemployed at risk of hunger and homelessness
while they wait.”); Svaldi, supra note 2 (discussing how one claimant’s “f inancial situation [was] deteriorating by the day” and he “can’t afford to f ill his truck with gas to go
job hunting”); Diane Wilson & Isabella Seman, Some Unemployed North Carolinians
Continue to Go Without Benef its as They Struggle with New Identity Verif ication Tool
ID.me, ABC NEWS (Apr. 8, 2021), https://abc11.com/idme-unemployment-id-me
-my/10498998 [https://perma.cc/ZLW6-BHMF] (describing one individual’s concern
that “bills are piling up”).
83. Aradhana Sharma & Akhil Gupta, Introduction, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE
STATE: A READER 13 (Aradhana Sharma & Akhil Gupta eds. 2006); see also GEOFFREY C.
BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS OUT: CLASSIF ICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
19 (1999) (“Politically and socially charged agendas are often f irst presented as purely
technical and they are diff icult even to see.”).
84. NELP Memo, supra note 81, at 1.
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applicants have a desktop or laptop, they speak English, they are literate, and they have a high degree of digital literacy. These assumptions are not true for many populations who became unemployed during the pandemic, particularly those that were low-income, elderly,
disabled, and non-English speaking.85 The digital divide posed a problem. Many low-income people access the internet via smartphones,
and yet the UI platforms often lack full accessibility to all their features
via smartphones.86 Moreover, certain smartphones used primarily by
low-income people were not compatible with the platforms at all, such
as prepaid phones or phones manufactured by non-major vendors.87
Some people lacked access to a smartphone of any sort. Due to a persistent digital divide, twenty percent of American adults do not have a
smartphone, and twenty-f ive percent do not have home broadband88—and low-income Americans and racial minorities are disproportionately disconnected.89 For claimants who tried to borrow computers from friends, relatives, or to use public computers, they often
85. See Ryan Burke, Mikey Dickerson, Lauren Lockwood, Tara McGuiness, Marina
Nitze, Ayushi Roy, & Emily Wright-Moore, A Playbook for Improving Unemployment Insurance Delivery, NEW AM. ch. 6 (June 22, 2021), https://www
.improveunemployment.com/experience [https://perma.cc/UZ8Y-YHW3]; Rebecca
Dixon, From Disrepair to Transformation: How to Revive Unemployment Insurance Information Technology & Infrastructure, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT 3, 8 (July 15, 2020),
https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Testimony-Disrepair-Transformation
-Revive-Unemployment-Information-Technology-Infrastructure.pdf [https://perma
.cc/M2EZ-GPHC].
86. Julia Simon-Mishel, Maurice Emsellem, Michele Evermore, Ellen Leclere, Andrew Stettner, & Martha Coven, Centering Workers: How to Modernize Unemployment
Insurance Technology, THE CENTURY FOUND. 7 (Sept. 17, 2020), https://s27147
.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/UI-mod-report_F INAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WFS3
-LB3K] (“Twenty-f ive percent of Latinx and 23 percent of Black adults, compared to
just 12 percent of white adults, are entirely smartphone dependent and do not use
broadband at home.”).
87. See ID.me Presents Barriers for Low Income People Seeking Unemployment Insurance and Other Government Benef its, CMTY. LEGAL SERVS. OF PHILA. 3 (Nov. 2021)
[hereinafter ID.me Barriers] https://clsphila.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/
IDme-issue-brief-f inal-11-2-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/FN22-446R].
88. Andrew Perrin, Mobile Technology and Home Broadband 2021, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(June 3, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/06/03/mobile
-technology-and-home-broadband-2021 [https://perma.cc/C66J-KJBX].
89. Emily A. Vogels, Digital Divide Persists Even as Americans with Lower Incomes
Make Gains in Tech Adoption, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 22, 2021), https://www
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/06/22/digital-divide-persists-even-as-americans
-with-lower-incomes-make-gains-in-tech-adoption [https://perma.cc/RPF5-EDMF];
Sara Atske & Andrew Perrin, Home Broadband Adoption, Computer Ownership Vary by
Race, Ethnicity in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 16, 2021), https://www
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/07/16/home-broadband-adoption-computer
-ownership-vary-by-race-ethnicity-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/9R7J-925E].
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found it impossible to satisfy the multi-factor authentication that
would allow them to download the agency’s application to another
person’s device.90 Further, jumping on someone’s else’s device inherently involves giving up one’s privacy in personal data.
Even with access to a computer and broadband, some claimants,
particularly senior citizens and non-English speaking people, lacked
the digital literacy to comply with complex and technical uploading
instructions.91 Instructions were often overly technical. For instance,
users in Philadelphia were told: “When you have set up MFA in your
ID.me account, you begin the sign-in process with your email address
and password, then you will also enter additional credentials—often,
a verif ication code, which has been sent to a trusted device, sometimes
via a trusted phone number.”92 This terminology is not accessible to
people with low digital literacy or non-English speakers.93
In Maryland, instructions were downright conf licting. The onscreen identity verif ication instructions told claimants on the one
hand to crop images (a skill many claimants lack), and on the other
hand that all four sides of a document must be submitted.94 Across the
country, disabled applicants struggled to navigate web-based systems
whose design and instructions failed to accommodate physical or visual impairments.95 In short, from state to state, claimants could not
establish their identities. As a result of these design injustices, thou-

90. ID.me Barriers, supra note 87, at 1–2.
91. Id. at 1; Simon-Mishel et al., supra note 86, at 2 (arguing that states made a
mistake in “failing to involve their customers—workers and employers—at critical
junctures” and “this led to systems touted as convenient and accessible, but which
claimants often found challenging and unintuitive”).
92. ID.me Barriers, supra note 87, at 5.
93. Twenty-four percent of American adults score at the lowest level of documentary literacy, “meaning that they could not read a package well enough to determine
the correct dosage of medicine to give a child.” Whitson & Haggerty, supra note 14, at
589.
94. Maryland’s BEACON Unemployment Insurance Application Webpage, MD. DEP’T
OF LAB., https://beacon.labor.md.gov [https://perma.cc/HVJ6-UK49].
95. See Katelyn Cioff i & Victoria Adelmant, The IRS’s Abandoned Facial Recognition Is Just the Tip of a Harmful Biometric Iceberg, SLATE (Feb. 14, 2022),
https://slate.com/technology/2022/02/irs-facial-recognition-biometrics-harm.html
[https://perma.cc/GP5D-D646]; Michael McLaughlin & Daniel Castro, Most State Employment Websites Fail Mobile and Accessiblity Tests, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND.,
(Apr.
15,
2020),
https://itif.org/publications/2020/04/15/most-state
-unemployment-websites-fail-mobile-and-accessibility-tests
[https://perma.cc/
M7KG-CPW7].
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sands of people gave up on the process in frustration, forgoing f inancial assistance intended to help them weather the pandemic.96 This is
a problem that extends far beyond UI programs; as Matthew Hull
states, “[p]oor and uneducated people unable to master the conventions of bureaucratic documentation or recruit for themselves a capable agent remain excluded even from programs aimed to help them.”97
Two specif ic identity verif ication methods appeared to have particularly inequitable impacts on poor people and minorities. Some
states (and several federal agencies) rely on knowledge-based
verif ication for remote identity proof ing in which an applicant is
asked multiple choice questions based on their credit history in order
to verify their identity.98 Yet this method is easy for identity thieves to
satisfy given the extensive data breaches at credit bureaus and reams
of personal data available on the dark web.99 Moreover, it does not
work for people who are credit invisible, that is, the eleven percent of
Americans—or twenty-six million people—who have no credit history or prof ile because they do not engage with mainstream f inancial
institutions.100 People who are credit invisible are disproportionately
Black and Hispanic and live in low-income neighborhoods.101
Second, verif ication systems that rely on facial recognition technology (FRT) were failing to recognize thousands of people—an entirely foreseeable problem in light of extensive research on the biased
outcomes of these biometric systems. Facial recognition technologies
are being adopted in a range of settings, from law enforcement to air
travel to retail stores and more.102 In a landmark study, Joy Buolomwini and Timnit Gebru found the least accuracy in FRT for Black
women, who faced much higher error rates than lighter-skin males,
96. ID.me Barriers, supra note 87, at 4.
97. Matthew S. Hull, Documents and Bureaucracy, 41 ANN. REV. OF ANTHROPOLOGY
251, 258–59 (2012).
98. Data Protection: Federal Agencies Need to Strengthen Online Identity Verif ication Processes, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (May 17, 2019) [hereinafter Data Protection] https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-19-288 [https://perma.cc/45EP-UEUL];
Jennifer Wagner & Genevieve Gaudet, Removing Barriers to Access from Remote Identity
Proof ing, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/
research/health/removing-barriers-to-access-from-remote-identity-proof ing
[https://perma.cc/CY6X-BRB5].
99. Data Protection, supra note 98.
100. Who Are the Credit Invisibles?, CONSUMER PROT. F IN. BUREAU 2 (2016),
https://f iles.consumerf inance.gov/f/documents/201612_cfpb_credit_invisible_
policy_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RMY5-NSK4].
101. Id. at 3–4.
102. See Lindsey Barrett, Ban Facial Recognition Technologies for Children—and for
Everyone Else, 26 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 223, 233–37 (2020).
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and similar f indings of algorithmic bias have emerged in other studies.103 Given these biases, numerous jurisdictions have outlawed FRT
for certain law enforcement purposes, and several Big Tech companies discontinued or put freezes on the law enforcement use of their
tools.104 However, FRT is expanding in the context of government programs, including UI.105 The issue of bias is concerning given that people of color suffered the higher rates of job loss, yet lower rates of UI
receipt than White workers.106
ID.me is a private vendor that at least twenty-seven states contract with for UI identity verif ication, as well as ten federal agencies.107
103. Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classif ication, 81 PROC. OF MACHINE LEARNING RSCH. 1
(2015); see also Patrick Grother, Mei Ngan, & Kayee Hanaoka, Face Recognition Vender
Test (FRVT), NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. (Sept. 2019), https://www.govinfo
.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-C13-a4a30985dc259996c42d67593fec5166/pdf/
GOVPUB-C13-a4a30985dc259996c42d67593fec5166.pdf [https://perma.cc/2T2Q
-U7XJ]; Jacob Snow, Amazon’s Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of Congress with Mugshots, ACLU (July 26, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/amazons-face-recognition-falsely-matched-28
[https://perma.cc/6G62-9ZR7] (“In a test the ACLU recently conducted of the facial
recognition tool, called ‘Rekognition,’ the software incorrectly matched 28 members of
Congress, identifying them as other people who have been arrested for a crime. . . . The
false matches were disproportionately people of color . . . .”).
104. See generally Peter N.K. Schuetz, F ly in the Face of Bias: Algorithmic Bias in
Law Enforcement’s Facial Recognition Technology and the Need for an Adaptive Legal
Framework, 39 J. L. & INEQ. 221 (2021).
105. See, e.g., Facial Recognition Technology: Current and Planned Uses by Federal
Agencies, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (Aug. 24, 2021), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/gao-21-526.pdf [https://perma.cc/VD8X-LLWV].
106. See Management Report: Preliminary Information on Potential Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Receipt of Unemployment Insurance Benef its During the COVID-19
Pandemic, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (Jun. 17, 2021), https://www.gao.gov/
products/gao-21-599r [https://perma.cc/K8U6-S8EW] (“Census Bureau survey data
indicates that 80% of White applicants reported receiving benef its, as compared to
73% of Black applicants.”); Monée F ields-White, Vivian Graubard, Alberto Rodríguez,
Nikki Zeichner, & Cassandra Robertson, Unpacking Inequities in Unemployment Insurance, NEW AM. (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.newamerica.org/pit/reports/
unpacking-inequities-unemployment-insurance/introduction
[https://perma.cc/
QN6K-T6FK].
107. See Rachel Metz, Want Your Unemployment Benef its? You May Have to Submit
to Facial Recognition F irst, CNN BUS. (July 23, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/
23/tech/idme-unemployment-facial-recognition/index.html
[https://perma.cc/
WS2P-SBWM]; see also Mia Sato, The Pandemic Is Testing the Limits of Face Recognition,
MIT TECH REV. (Sept. 28, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/09/28/
1036279/pandemic-unemployment-government-face-recognition
[https://perma
.cc/9X4Q-4DP9]; Drew Harwell, IRS Abandons Facial Recognition Plan After F irestorm
of Criticism, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2022/02/07/irs-idme-face-scans [https://perma.cc/UT4A-BMNV].
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Over seventy-three million Americans have accessed the service.108
Their FRT compares a photo ID with a video self ie that an applicant
takes on their phone and uploads to ID.me.109 Almost immediately after ID.me was rolled out for UI, claimants began reporting diff iculty
with the technology, taking to Twitter and online message boards to
vent their frustrations.110 The technology failed to recognize many
people, who then complained of waiting for days and weeks to reach
a human “referee.”111 One frustrated applicant stated that ID.me rejected his video self ie, “didn’t give us a reason, just rejected it. It rejected it three times, and then it locked me out of the system.”112 He
could not reach the company for several weeks until his tweets caught
the company’s attention.113
In November 2021, the IRS announced that taxpayers would need
to use ID.me to access their tax records and online services. A furious
backlash ensued (that was missing with respect to the low-wage
workers who were forced to use ID.me to access UI).114 Lawmakers on
both sides of the aisle opposed the plan, demanding that IRS abandon
the use of facial recognition technology.115 In February 2022, the IRS
announced it would no longer require ID.me for identity verif ication.116 Shortly thereafter, ID.me stated that its existing users across

108. Harwell, supra note 107.
109. Metz, supra note 107.
110. See Andrew Kenney, No Internet, No Unemployment: Solving This ID.me Glitch
Took Two Months and a Journey Across the Rural Front Range, CPR NEWS (July 7, 2021),
https://www.cpr.org/2021/07/07/colorado-unemployment-idme-glitch-internet
-access [https://perma.cc/X69A-9QQQ]; Bree Guy, Nevadans Seeking Unemployment
Benef its Report ID.me Issues Around the Valley, KTNV LAS VEGAS (Aug. 18, 2021),
https://www.ktnv.com/news/detr-id-me-issues-around-the-valley [https://perma
.cc/EPV8-62TC]; Jennifer Lewke, News10NBC Investigates: Many Struggle to Get
Through ID.me Process, NEWS10NBC (Sept. 16, 2021), https://www.whec.com/news/
many-struggle-to-get-through-idme-process/6240392
[https://perma.cc/44FF
-QFC5].
111. Todd Feathers, Facial Recognition Failures Are Locking People Out of Unemployment Systems, VICE (June 18, 2021), https://www.vice.com/en/article/
5dbywn/facial-recognition-failures-are-locking-people-out-of-unemployment
-systems [https://perma.cc/9D5D-BDBY].
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Drew Harwell, Private Contractor to Drop Facial Recognition Requirement for
All State and Federal Agencies After Backlash Over IRS Plan, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/02/09/irs-idme-facial
-recognition-login [https://perma.cc/79MN-QJ3M].
115. Id.
116. Id.
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its many platforms could delete their self ies and photo data.117 It also
proclaimed that it would make facial recognition on its platforms optional and that users would be able to use video chat instead.118 Critics
countered that this option was unsatisfactory both due to its track record of unacceptable delays and given that many people would be misled into thinking their biometric data was being held securely by a
government agency.119
Identity verif ication software has become more than a tool for assessing eligibility; it has become the def inition of eligibility. This is
contrary to the remedial purpose of UI benef its and many other government services. As one legal services provider aptly summarized,
“[t]he issue is whether the person is who they say they are, not
whether they can produce perfect identity verif ication paperwork or
successfully use a complex computer app.”120
B. DUE PROCESS
The second major barrier to accurate and timely identity verif ication was a lack of due process for claimants, exacerbated by the automation of these systems. Under the Constitution, citizens are entitled
to notice and a hearing before they are denied public benef its. Indeed,
the United States Department of Labor, in an advisory to state workforce agencies, reiterated that claimants accused of fraud were entitled to due process rights, including “clear instructions” setting forth
how claimants can meet identity verif ication requirements.121 The notice must include the types of documentation accepted by the agency,
instructions on where and how to send the information and an explanation of the consequences for failure to respond timely.122 Claimants
are also entitled to a written determination of eligibility.123
Despite these requirements, grounded in decades of legal precedent, claimants across the country found their claims denied, had their
accounts frozen, or faced wrongful accusations of fraud—all without
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting Evan Greer, director of a digital rights advocacy group, who stated
“biometrics have no place being used by agencies that provide people with basic services”).
120. ID.me Barriers, supra note 87, at 5.
121. Suzan G. Levine, Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 16-21, U.S. DEP’T
OF LABOR 7 (Apr. 13, 2021), https://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/UIPL/UIPL_16
-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/245L-L5Y3].
122. Id.
123. Id.
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an explanation or opportunity for a hearing.124 Certain design features
were destined to ensnare millions of innocent people. For instance, a
fraud alert can result when several applications use the same address,
even though this is common for multi-generational families (a category that grew during the housing crunch precipitated by the pandemic) and people in congregate housing settings, such as homeless
shelters.125 Systems also commonly reject ethnic names, including
those “that don’t follow the traditional American convention of ‘F irst,
Middle, Last’ or that include characters outside the English alphabet,
leading names to be misprinted on social security cards or the same
name appearing differently on a credit card and a school ID.”126
As of December 2021, at least a dozen class actions were pending
nationwide alleging violations of due process associated with unwarranted delays and denials in receiving benef its.127 In Maryland, a class
of claimants alleged in federal court that the UI “system has failed
completely: either their claims for benef its have languished for
months or their benef its have been suddenly cut off for similar periods without notice or explanation.”128 Many of these delays and denials were linked to suspected fraud and the failure of the state’s automated system to accept proof of identity.129 Further, thousands of
people received state demands to repay the state for benef its already
received (called an overpayment), also without notice of the basis of
the overpayment or an opportunity to contest it.130 Many overpayment claims were linked to alleged fraud and identity verif ication failures.131
The experience of one of the named Maryland plaintiffs in the
class action is representative of the due process violations faced by
thousands of claimants. The claimant is a grandmother and former
non-prof it case manager for people with disabilities who lost her job
in February 2021.132 A month after submitting her application and still
124. NELP Memo, supra note 81, at 3–4.
125. F ields-White et al., supra note 106.
126. Id.
127. Ovetta Wiggins, Jobless Workers in Maryland Wage Another Legal Battle over
Unemployment Benef its, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/dc-md-va/2021/12/23/maryland-unemployment-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/
8T36-5MTD].
128. Complaint at 2, Gorres v. Robinson, No. 1:21CV03029 (D. Md. Nov. 24, 2021),
ECF No. 1.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. paras. 47–48.
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not receiving benef its, she was locked out of her account with no explanation.133 Repeated attempts to reach a human representative left
her on hold for hours.134 F ive months later, she f inally received instructions to upload her identif ication information, 135 but she was unable to do so because her account remained frozen,136 apparently due
to suspected fraud. Despite numerous, subsequent communications
with the state agency via an online chat function, by email, by phone,
and in-person appointments, she remained locked out of her account,
without benef its, and without a written determination of eligibility.137
As of November 2021, she remained in limbo.138 She had not found
another job and turned to food stamps to feed her family.139 The f inancial stress caused her panic attacks and sleeplessness, requiring medication.140
Despite the DOL requirement that states clearly set forth their
identity verif ication requirements,141 the acceptable forms of documentation remain unclear, leaving unfettered discretion in the hands
of low-level bureaucrats and/or system designers. The federal government has not issued uniform standards for identity verif ication in
UI, nor have state legislatures or agencies done so. As the National Employment Law Project concluded, “[w]ith limited guidance from [the
federal government], individual states were left to implement these
requirements on their own.”142 Without legislative or notice and comment processes, designed to enhance democratic accountability and
provide for public input, state agencies were making it up as they went
along. One contractor revealed that “nobody has a def inition of ‘fraud,’
or any clear cut process or guidelines to follow and that workers believe they will be personally punished if any claim they work on is
later found to be fraudulent.”143
Across the country, identity verif ication standards change often,
without notice to claimants, and the standards continue to lack

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. paras. 49–50.
Id. para 51.
Id. para. 53.
Id. para. 53.
Id. para. 55.
Id. para. 56.
Id. para. 57.
Id.
Levine, supra note 121, at 4.
NELP Memo, supra note 81, at 1.
F ields-White et al., supra note 106.
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specif icity.144 Written denials are vague, often telling claimants nothing more than that they failed “to comply with Agency procedures,”
and making it impossible to contest the f inding or to bring a claim into
compliance.145 A search of Maryland’s entire website for UI turned up
no guidance whatsoever on how to satisfy identity verif ication requirements, including a twenty-f ive page User Guide to the state’s automated system and a thirty-three page guide entitled “UI in Maryland.”146 And yet, legal services attorneys represented clients whose
identity documents were denied because they were expired (which
may limit lawful authority to drive but has no bearing on a person’s
identity), they were not in color, all four corners were not apparent,
both sides of the document were not provided, the document had
frayed edges, or the document was too old—such as a f ifty-year-old
person’s f ifty-year-old, but perfectly legible, social security card.147
The lack of clear standards is particularly diff icult when it comes to
alternative documentation for people who do not have photo IDs or
otherwise cannot satisfy online verif ication methods.148 Inconsistent
and variable instructions make it hard for these people—often among
society’s most vulnerable—to comply with automated ID verif ication
systems.
C. PRIVATIZATION
Third, the states’ outsourcing of identity verif ication to thirdparty vendors lacked transparency and blurred lines of accountability.
In 2021, over half of the states contracted with private companies to
handle identify verif ication.149 The main player is ID.me,150 used in at
144. NELP Memo, supra note 81, at 3.
145. Id.
146. BEACON 2.0 Claimant User Guide, MD. DEP’T OF LAB. (Oct. 13, 2020),
https://www.dllr.state.md.us/employment/uibeaconclaimantguide.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/CJ7R-GCXA]; Unemployment Insurance in Maryland: A Guide to Reemployment, MD. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dllr.state.md.us/employment/clmtguide/
uiclmtpamphlet.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7ET-NQLN].
147. Telephone Interview with Cornelia Bright Gordon, Dir. of Advoc. for Admin.
L., Md. Legal Aid (Oct. 29, 2021).
148. NELP Memo, supra note 81, at 2.
149. Paresh Dave, Factbox: States Using ID.me, Rival Identity Check Tools for Jobless
Claims, REUTERS (July 22, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/states-using
-idme-rival-identity-check-tools-jobless-claims-2021-07-22 [https://perma.cc/Q3UZ
-WEYP].
150. What Is ID.me’s Role in Unemployment Insurance?, ID.ME, https://help.id.me/
hc/en-us/articles/360054015553-What-is-ID-me-s-role-in-unemployment
-insurance- [https://perma.cc/X393-6Q3L].
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least twenty-seven states.151 As noted earlier, ID.me’s system rejected
many eligible claimants, who could not meet the system’s requirements and then struggled to reach a human “referee,” which is the supposed backup method for establishing identity.152 ID.me responded to
media stories about the diff iculties by claiming that user error was responsible.153 Blaming users for the failures of a technology that was
not designed to meet their needs is entirely consistent with the neoliberal thrust of the current social welfare state, or “the idea that public
sector institutions should be driven by market-like mechanisms, free
choice, f lexibility and continuous processes of organizational self-optimization.”154 For their part, citizens “have increasingly been framed
as self-suff icient, active and responsible individuals who not only can
but must take on responsibilities and risks previously handled by collective state institutions.”155 Privatization puts a buffer between citizens and state services, thus raising concerns about accountability, or
“being answerable to authority that can mandate desirable conduct
and sanction conduct that breaches identif ied obligations. In a democracy, the ultimate authority should be the general population . . .”156 It
is essential that the public have means to ensure that private contractors are carrying out their public purposes fairly and effectively.
The deployment of ID.me and similar products is part of a larger
trend of privatization in social services.157 Privatization generally involves the government contracting out a formerly public function to
private entity.158 Privatization proponents claim that private companies can deliver services with greater eff iciency and innovation than
government, and at a lower cost due to competition, freedom from red
tape, and fewer restriction on managing employees.159 Opponents
counter that privatization lessens governmental accountability, which
151. See Dave, supra note 149. Federal agencies using ID.me include the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Social Security Administration, and the Internal Revenue
Services. See also Metz, supra note 107.
152. See supra notes 107–112 and accompanying text.
153. See Feathers, supra note 111.
154. Jannick Schou & Morten Hjelholt, Digital State Spaces: State Rescaling and Advanced Digitalization, 7 TERRITORY, POL., GOVERNANCE 438, 445 (2019).
155. Id.
156. Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1260 (2003).
157. See Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare,
89 CAL. L. REV. 569, 581 (2001); Nestor M. Davidson, Relational Contracts in the Privatization of Social Welfare: The Case of Housing, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 263, 267 (2006).
158. Gilman, supra note 157, at 591–93.
159. Id. at 596.
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is of particular concern when dealing with marginalized persons who
have less political inf luence to demand program changes.160 Critics
also query whether privatization delivers the promised cost savings
and point to the ways in which large corporations mirror the bureaucratic structures of government.161 Despite these differences, both
sides of this debate share some common ground:
F irst, that policymaking should remain in the control of politically accountable government authorities; second, that the primary purpose of privatization is to achieve greater eff iciency; and third, that this eff iciency gain depends on the claim that private contractors are competitive entities in a
competitive environment.162

The privatization of identity verif ication is failing these parameters.
F irst, the federal and state failures to def ine with specif icity the
acceptable forms of identif ication, especially with regard to alternative forms of identif ication, left this foundational question within the
hands of private contractors. This also allowed for lower standards for
data security, because private vendors do not have to follow the strict
data security standards required of government agencies that handle
personal data.163
Second, it is not clear that a private vendor can handle identity
verif ication more eff iciently than government, especially considering
that much of the data used by private vendors originated in government databases.164 As one commentator notes, “government’s providing data to the private sector and then buying them back again is
clearly extremely ineff icient.”165 Moreover, citizens must establish
their identity for a variety of programs, each of which has its own
standards and technology.166 This duplication “leaves governments
paying multiple competing vendors for duplicate records, it leaves
people with multiple accounts with different vendors, and it leaves applicants puzzled about why they can validate their identity for one
public service but not another.”167 Further, underinvestment in staff
is plaguing the UI system, including the identity verif ication components. Part of the UI system collapse during the pandemic is directly
160. Id. at 597.
161. Id. at 596.
162. Edward Rubin, The Possibilities and Limitations of Privatization, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 890, 893 (2010).
163. Jaquith, supra note 42, at 56.
164. Id. at 55.
165. Id. at 56.
166. Id. at 57.
167. Id.
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traceable to the downsizing of staff over the last decade.168 For instance, in some states, including Pennsylvania and Georgia, there are
half as many UI employees as there were during the Great Recession.169 The turn to automation is an attempt to get more for less, but
it has only proved the necessity of keeping humans in the loop. As Michael Reisch states, with regard to social services privatization, most
of the eff iciencies “have occurred by lowering workers’ wages and
benef its, reducing services, diminishing the quality of staff development and training programs, imposing fees on clients, and focusing
service provision on new, less diff icult, and more aff luent service consumers.”170
Third, there is a limited market among identity verif ication vendors. Right now, it appears that the dominant players providing identif ication services to government agencies are ID.me and LexisNexis.
The failures of ID.me have already been discussed.171 When the Social
Security Administration (SSA) hired LexisNexis to determine whether
recipients of needs-based benef its owned unreported and thus disqualifying real property, false accusations soared.172 An investigation
found that LexisNexis’s use of name-matching to link claimant identities to property records was sloppy and inaccurate. By using f irst and
last names only, the algorithm disproportionately impacted people of
color, who are more likely to have similar names.173 For instance, the
Census shows that one quarter of the Hispanic population shares
twenty-six surnames.174 Further, LexisNexis claimed it did not have to
meet the accuracy standards of consumer reporting agencies under
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), and SSA used this disavowal to

168. Mar Hicks, Built to Last, LOGIC (Aug. 31, 2020), https://logicmag.io/care/
built-to-last [https://perma.cc/G5LM-FGC9].
169. Jed Pressgrove, Staff ing Issues Complicate Unemployment Agency Tech Woes,
GOVERNING (May 26, 2020), https://www.governing.com/work/Staff ing-Issues
-Complicate-Unemployment-Agency-Tech-Woes.html
[https://perma.cc/YK5F
-KP7B].
170. Michael Reisch, United States: Social Welfare Policy and Privatization in PostIndustrial Society, in THE WELFARE STATE IN POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 253, 259 (Jason L. Powell & Jon Hendricks eds. 2009).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 149–151.
172. Sarah Mancini, Kate Lang, & Chi Chi Wu, Mismatched and Mistaken: How the
Use of an Inaccurate Private Database Results in SSI Recipients Unjustly Losing Benef its,
NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. 3 (2021), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/credit_reports/
RptMismatchedF INAL041421.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VSH-59EV].
173. Id. at 3–4.
174. Id. at 21.
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deny claimants the opportunity to contest the f indings.175 The outsourcing of eligibility determinations allowed the government to
freeride on the private vendor’s self-serving determination that it did
not have to comply with governing law, resulting in due process violations.
IV. THE FUTURE OF IDENTITY VERIF ICATION
The identity verif ication failures in UI systems during the pandemic are a harbinger of the future, in which increasing numbers of
private and governmental agencies are turning to automated systems
to establish that they are serving the proper people. This is an entirely
legitimate as well as necessary goal, indeed, “large-scale systems of
social assistance require working civil registration.”176 However, as
the UI experience shows, it is not easily achieved without attention to
issues of equity. The current focus on eff iciency and cost-savings in
identity verif ication systems is a form of plutocratic regulation, as
def ined by Greene, in which the needs of the more aff luent are satisf ied, while a sizable minority—mostly from politically disenfranchised communities—is left behind.177 At bottom, identity verif ication
is a powerful tool of social control that can be liberating or oppressive,
depending on its social context and the manner of its deployment.178
History is littered with examples in which identity was used to
subjugate people, and even to carry out genocide.179 In their study of
classif ication systems, Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star examine
how the government of apartheid-era South Africa relied on identity
passbooks to control and limit the movements and opportunities of
people deemed non-white.180 Passbooks were “a compilation of documents attesting to birth, education, employment history, marriage,
and other life events,” that allowed for “comprehensive surveillance
of their actions” by the state.181 Classif ication as Black determined
175. Id. at 3, 28–35.
176. REGISTRATION AND RECOGNITION: DOCUMENTING THE PERSON IN WORLD HISTORY 11
(Keith Breckenridge & Simon Szreter eds. 2012).
177. Greene, supra note 5, at 65.
178. Whether registration systems are empowering to individuals “or alternatively, disempowering and controlling them . . . is a historically contingent matter, related to many diverse inf luences.” REGISTRATION AND RECOGNITION, supra note 176, at
22.
179. Id. at 13 (“For social historians who have confronted registration directly as a
tool of segregation, it is the meticulous administrative arrangements of twentieth-century genocide that have loomed ominously in the analytical background.”).
180. BOWKER & STAR, supra note 83, at 198.
181. Id.
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where one could live, work, and be, as well as the denial of a multitude
of civil and political rights.182 As a result, many people sought to be
classif ied as white, and the process of seeking reclassif ication led “to
thousands of ironic and tragic cases where classif ication and reclassif ication separated families, disrupted biographies, and damaged individuals beyond repair.”183 Another horrif ic example of identity classif ication occurred in World War II, where, under Nazi occupation, the
city of Amsterdam produced a map and list of residents that allowed
the Nazis to round up and deport 65,000 members of the city’s Jewish
population.184
In the United States, we have our own sordid history, for instance,
requiring identif ication documents of free Blacks in the antebellum
South, and Chinese immigrants in the 1890s.185 Today, the United
States requires noncitizens to carry identif ication, and law enforcement agents can demand papers from people that appear foreign-born
and are within one hundred miles of a border town.186 Jordan Weinburg highlights the social control purposes of these identity verif ication requirements: “All of these groups have been perceived as including members who were subversive, encroaching, or illegal, but who
would be too hard to identify and classify without the aid of forced
identif ication.”187
In contrast to these oppressive effects, the advent of the Social
Security Number (SSN) in 1935, as part of the New Deal, came to be
seen as a marker of inclusion and, as Sarah Igo writes, a “positive identif ication with one’s status as a known citizen.”188 The federal government created the system of giving each citizen a nine-digit number in
order to link workers to their government-funded retirement accounts, a new form of f inancial security in a time of economic upheaval.189 At their inception, SSNs were not without controversy because of the specter that they could serve as a tool for
totalitarianism.190 However, SSNs ultimately gained widespread acceptance because the public saw them as a “route to privilege rather
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
(2018).
189.
190.

Id. at 218.
Id.
SCOTT, supra note 68, at 260.
Jonathan Weinberg, Proving Identity, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 731, 733 (2017).
Id. at 734.
Id.
SARAH E. IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN MODERN AMERICA 65
Id.
Id.
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than privation”191 and a “bargain struck between citizens and the
state.”192 A social security number is the closest Americans have to a
national identif ication marker,193 and its uses have extended far beyond linking workers to their retirement accounts.194 It is used by numerous federal and state agencies, as well as private entities, such as
banks, credit reporting agencies, and health care providers.195 The
number serves as a data backbone for many identity management systems, such as E-Verify, which is used by employers to conf irm the citizenship status of workers. 196 However, Americans are not required
to carry Social Security cards, and the cards themselves have no photos or biometric information, limiting their eff icacy as a standalone
identity verif ication tool.197
Automated identity verif ication systems in UI currently occupy
an uneasy space between these oppressive and empowering extremes—they are wrapped in the rhetoric of ease and eff iciency but
are having exclusionary effects for millions of Americans. Why would
states adopt identity verif ication processes that routinely fail their citizens? In some instances, these appear to have been intentional
choices, as a means for saving money by churning people with little
political capital out of the system. For instance, in F lorida, the state
was processing only ten to f ifteen percent of UI applications during
the peak of pandemic-related unemployment.198 An aide to Governor
Ron DeSantis admitted that the prior administration of Governor Rick
Scott designed the UI system to “make it harder for people to get
benef its” and to keep unemployment numbers low in order “to give
the governor something to brag about.”199

191. Id. at 63.
192. Id. at 83.
193. All legal residents in the United States receive a SSN at birth. Weinberg, supra
note 185, at 787; see also Hu, supra note 10, at 1517 (“[E]xperts have observed that the
Social Security Number has morphed into a universal de facto national ID number.”).
194. Hu, supra note 10, at 1517.
195. Weinberg, supra note 185, at 787–88.
196. Hu, supra note 10, at 1517.
197. Weinberg, supra note 185, at 795.
198. Patricia Mazzei & Sabrina Tavernise, ‘F lorida Is a Terrible State to Be an Unemployed Person’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
04/23/us/f lorida-coronavirus-unemployment.html [https://perma.cc/A2X5-WUVK].
199. See Anna Palmer & Jake Sherman, POLITICO Playbook: The Coronavirus Show
vs. the Reality, POLITICO (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/
playbook/2020/04/03/the-coronavirus-show-vs-the-reality-488792 [https://perma
.cc/LLX5-X8A4].
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Even states that did not intend to cut the UI rolls nevertheless
made conscious decisions about how to design their automated systems and the levels of staff ing support for the systems. As public policy professors Pamela Herd and Don Moynihan conclude, the adoption
of administrative burdens is a choice, including the decision to rely
extensively on automation.200 Numerous studies show that increased
automation leads to fewer UI applications and lower levels of approved applications.201 This is “bureaucratic disentitlement” in action,
or the placing of procedural barriers, such as complex and ill-def ined
identity verif ication requirements, in the way of claimants to discourage them from applying, and if they survive the application gauntlet,
to increase the numbers of denials.202 At the end of the day, identity
verif ication is a form of social control. Matthew Hull explains, “Bureaucracies . . . exercise their control through the uncertainty, ambiguity, and fear created by leaving people and things undocumented or
by routinely disputing the validity of documents.”203
This raises the questions of how to adopt identity verif ication
processes that serve, rather than subjugate, citizens. Worker advocacy
groups highlight a variety of remedies for the current UI failures involving identity verif ication, including mandating that states adopt
the identity verif ication standards from the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST); providing in-person, governmentrun identity verif ication options at multiple, convenient locations; accepting expired driver’s licenses; designing platforms for smartphone
compatibility; allowing a variety of alternative identif ication documents; prohibiting knowledge based verif ication; ensuring language
access on UI platforms; and prohibiting private vendors to render
f inal eligibility decisions.204 States should also engage in regular au-

200. Pamela Herd & Donald Moynihan, Administrative Burdens in the Time of Covid19, 36 INST. FOR RSCH. ON POVERTY FOCUS 4, 9 (2020), https://www.irp.wisc.edu/wp/
wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Focus-36-3b.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VDT-CSU2].
201. See Simon-Mishel et al., supra note 86, at 36–37; Burke et al., supra note 85,
ch. 13; George Wentworth, Closing Doors on the Unemployed: Why Most Jobless Workers
Are Not Receiving Unemployment Insurance and What States Can Do About It, NAT’L EMP.
L. PROJECT 21 (Dec. 2017), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Closing
-Doors-on-the-Unemployed12_19_17-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/LDD6-UAZW].
202. See Susan D. Bennett, “No Relief but Upon the Term of Coming into the House”—
Controlled Spaces, Invisible Disentitlements, and Homelessness in an Urban Shelter System, 104 YALE L.J. 2157, 2159 (1995).
203. Hull, supra note 97, at 258.
204. See NELP Memo, supra note 81, at 6; see also Dixon, supra note 85, at 9–10.
See generally Burke et al., supra note 85.
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diting and public reporting of identif ication verif ication statistics, including not only suspected and conf irmed cases of fraud, the mode of
verif ication used, and the methods used for investigation, but also the
numbers of claimants who were accused of fraud, who appeal the determinations and the outcomes of appeals, who start but fail to complete applications, and who are eligible but never apply.205
Another proposal is to build out identity verif ication services
from existing federal databases. Technologist Waldo Jaquith proposes
either Login.gov, a product of the General Services Administration
that is NIST-compliant and provides a single sign-on that can be used
across federal government agencies, or the Federal Data Services Hub,
which is part of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and
combines government and commercial data sources to verify identity
for individuals applying for health insurance under Obamacare.206 He
states,
By integrating and expanding access to the existing federal services offered
by Login.gov and the Federal DSH, individuals would no longer need to maintain a series of accounts for each separate agency or government service and
could instead create a single government login that unites all of their interactions with government.”207

Expanding either of these tools would require a commitment to data
security and data privacy controls.
Despite an American cultural aversion to a national identity system,208 we are likely headed to a uniform identity management system, whether it happens in one fell swoop via legislation or incrementally through linkages among existing and expanding databases.
Margaret Hu explains that traditional forms of bureaucratic surveillance, such as Social Security Cards and driver’s licenses, are likely going to combined with geolocation tracking (through RF ID) and biometric forms of identity, such as f ingerprints, iris scans, and DNA, thus
facilitating a convergence of “cybersurveillance-body tracking and

205. In some states, labor agencies are required to do regular reporting and/or
have a public dashboard listing various metrics related to the processing of UI claims.
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 50.12.370 (2021) (requiring quarterly reporting and a
dashboard). These requirements could mandate public reporting of data related to
identity verif ication, as well as data related to ease and rates of claimant access.
206. Jaquith, supra note 42, at 57–58.
207. Id.
208. A. Michael Froomkin, Identity Cards and Identity Romanticism, in LESSONS FROM
THE IDENTITY TRAIL: ANONYMITY, PRIVACY AND IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED SOCIETY 245 (Ian
Kerr, Valerie Steeves, & Carole Lucock eds. 2009).
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dataveillance-biographical tracking.”209 Indeed, in recent years, numerous federal bills have been proposed to create high-tech, digital
forms of identity in the name of national security and border control.210
Regardless of how identity verif ication unfolds, either segmented
in multiple programs or unif ied under the auspices of the federal government, identity verif ication in social welfare systems requires much
closer attention to issues of equity and privacy. As researcher Emnet
Tafesse states, “What we need is a way to think about data-driven
identif ication practices of the digital welfare state as a resource to enact belonging, rather than a technology for individuating and targeting.”211 Currently, identity verif ication systems are designed around a
presumption of fraud, despite the fact that most cases of so-called
fraud are the result of innocent mistakes by caseworkers and claimants due to complex program requirements.212 Instead of fraud-f irst
design, which stigmatizes and harms social welfare recipients, principles of user-centered design justice could improve identity verif ication systems dramatically. Design justice is “a framework for analysis
of how design distributes benef its and burdens between various
groups of people.”213 As Sasha Costanza-Chock explains, input from
and accountability to impacted communities is essential to design justice.214 One of the principles of the design justice network, an organization of designers, artists, technologists, and community organizers,
is that “everyone is an expert based on their own lived experience, and
that we all have unique and brilliant contributions to bring to a design
process.”215 The rollout of identity verif ication in UI systems was contrary to these principles; it was top-down, it did not involve impacted
communities or other stakeholders, and it did not seek to “sustain,

209. Hu, supra note 10, at 1480–81.
210. Id. at 1483.
211. Emnet Tafesse, Between Belonging and Individuating: Data, Identif ication, Diaspora, DATA & SOC’Y: POINTS (Dec. 8 2020), https://points.datasociety.net/between
-belonging-and-individuating-data-identif ication-diaspora-9fcdf010e0ce
[https://perma.cc/WFQ9-ZKFM].
212. See Unpacking Inequities, supra note 106, at 15-16.
213. SASHA COSTANZA-CHOCK, DESIGN JUSTICE: COMMUNITY-LED PRACTICES TO BUILD THE
WORLDS WE NEED at 23 (2020) (ebook).
214. Id. at 25, 99.
215. Design Justice Network Principles, DESIGN JUST. NETWORK, https://designjustice
.org/read-the-principles [https://perma.cc/3WZU-5RTL].
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heal and empower” communities.216 Greater consultation with stakeholders would have avoided many of the design failures that claimants
faced.
To enhance legal remedies, Greene’s identity theft proposal could
be expanded to include people trying to obtain identity documentation and those denied by and locked out of identity verif ication systems. Greene suggests a federally funded agency that awards grants to
local entities that can provide quick legal services to identity theft victims.217 The localized approach and expanded funding would be a welcome improvement for victims of identity theft and identity denial. At
the same time, we need to be wary of putting the entire burden on
individuals to police their own identities while letting the entities that
prof it from surveillance capitalism off the hook. Greene’s proposal
somewhat risks further individualizing a structural problem. As Jennifer Whitson and Kevin Haggerty explain, identity theft laws put the
onus on individuals to manage their own risk.218 While aff luent people
have the aptitude and resources for self-management, including the
ability to “purchase shredders, secure computers and even invest in
identity theft insurance,” many less wealthy people lack this awareness or capacity.219
“Disconnected from the f lows of informational capitalism, consigned to peripheral economic sectors and often struggling simply to make ends meet in
the face of overwhelming family and workplace responsibilities, large segments of Western societies are self-evidently disadvantaged in their abilities
to manage their virtual identity and rectify problems when they arise.”220

Having a lawyer does not solve this gross imbalance. The truth is
that even with two decades of consumer law experience, I can struggle
to assist victims of identity theft because the underlying laws have few
teeth, while available procedures are time-consuming and Kafkaesque in nature. As consumer advocate Chi Chi Wu explains, “The
credit bureaus’ loose matching procedures contribute to the problem
of identity theft, and their data breaches give thieves the tools needed
to commit fraud.”221 And yet when “consumers try to f ix the aftereffects of identity theft, furnishers often fail to believe them and the
216. Id.
217. Greene, supra note 5, at 119–22.
218. Whitson & Haggerty, supra note 14, at 588.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 589.
221. Chi Chi Wu, Consumer Credit Reporting: Assessing Accuracy and Compliance,
NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. 14 (May 26, 2021), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/credit_
reports/Testimony_HFSC_OI_credit_reporting.pdf [https://perma.cc/8B3V-RDQH].
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credit bureaus take the furnishers’ side.”222 In short, the individualistic measures that shape identity theft and denial “are themselves part
of a political strategy whereby institutions are divesting themselves of
responsibility for the full social and economic costs of the risks that
they have produced.”223 It is clear that identity theft and identity denials require stronger, underlying substantive legal rights and duties
that shift responsibility to the private and governmental entities that
prof it from and rely upon consumer data. With enforceable standards
and shared responsibility, the localized and well-funded network of
legal services lawyers envisioned by Greene will be able to truly advocate for clients victimized by identity theft and identity denials.

222. Id.
223. Whitson & Haggerty, supra note 14, at 591.

